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I. Introduction 
T hroughout the history of warfare it has been clear that the ability of a nation at war to obtain logistic support from overseas sources has been a major 
factor--sometimes the dominant factor--in its ability to continue the war effort. 
Few nations have the economic independence to prosecute a war without 
outside resources, or, at least, without the ability to move their implements of 
war, provisions, men and material where they are needed. For most nations this 
requires an ability to operate their merchant fleets in a hostile maritime 
environment. 
During the Napoleonic era, both France and England utilized their differing 
strengths in an attempt to curtail the other's logistic and commercial capabilities. 
In the American Civil War, the blockade of the Confederacy was a principal 
component of the Union's war strategy. The indispensable condition for victory 
by Japan in its 1905 war with Russia was control of the seas. Without this 
advantage, Russia could have resupplied its superior land armies from the sea. 
During the progress of both W orId Wars, success of the maritime resupply effort 
of the Allied Powers, particularly Great Britain, was the sine qua non of victory. 
More recenrly, the conduct of both Iran and Iraq in the Persian/Arabian Gulf 
Tanker War confirmed the importance to the warring parties of interdicting 
merchant shipping, even for a localized war effort. If it is true that merchant 
shipping can be critical to a nation's ability to prosecute a war effort, it is equally 
true that the opposing power will seek to interdict that supply effort. Tactics, 
weapons systems and geography are variables that will affect any interdiction 
effort but the interdiction effort fits nearly with the general principles ofwar.1 
The conundrum of this situation is that while merchant shipping contributes in 
a major way to the prosecution of a nation's war effort, traditional law regards 
merchant ships as civilian objects and merchant seamen as civilians and thus not 
legitimate targets of direct attack. 
The experience ofWorId War I demonstrated that a belligerent whose war 
effort required it to cut off seaborne logistic support for its enemy would 
nevertheless target enemy merchant ships. In an effort to protect civilian 
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passengers from the ravages of war, particularly from the threat posed by the 
submarine, the London Protocol of 1936 sought to codify a requirement that 
subjected submarines to the same rules that were applicable to surface warships 
in their actions against enemy merchant ships. As we are all aware, the practices 
of the Second W orld War diverged substantially from those laid down in that 
Protocol, as did the realities of modem weapons systems, naval platforms and 
naval tactics. The result is an apparent gap between putative conventional law 
and state practice. The naval targeting policies of the United States, as reflected 
in the two naval manuals that have been published by the Navy since World 
War II-the LAw of Naval Waifare (NWIP 10-2, 1955) and The Commander's 
Handbook on the LAw of Naval Operations (NWP-9, 1987)-have wrestled with 
this gap between the putative conventional law and state practice. It is the 
purpose of this paper to examine the nature of this apparent gap and appraise 
the success of the most recent publication (The Commander's Handbook) in 
bridging it. 
II. Conventional Law 
Traditional international law distinguishes between enemy warships and 
enemy merchant ships. Warships are instruments of war and subject to attack 
and destruction without warning. Merchant ships, even those sailing under the 
flag of the enemy, are considered as civilian objects and manned by civilian crews, 
and so long as they maintain their proper role, are subject only to seizure as prize 
and subsequent condemnation in prize courts of the capturing belligerent. Only 
in special circumstances2 is the capturing power allowed to destroy the prize, 
and then only after removing the passengers, crew and ship's papers to a place 
ofsafety.3 
Since the tum of the century, both nations and international law publicists 
have been concerned with how to reconcile these principles with the realities 
of the means and methods of naval warfare-particularly the submarine, but also 
including military aircraft-that have developed since that time. The 1899 
Hague Peace Conference wrestled with the issue of submarine warfare but 
focused more on the unchivalrous methodology of destruction than on its 
target.4 The cruelties of the commerce war at sea sharpened that focus and no 
doubt contributed to the eventual agreement embodied in the 1936 Protocol. 
Yet the 1936 Protocol has a broader genesis than submarine warfare, and it is 
important to review some of the origins of customary and conventional law 
relevant to targeting merchant vessels. 
Four Conventions adopted at the Hague in 1907, Convention (VI) Relating 
to the Status of Enemy Merchant Ships at the Outbreak of Hostilities,s Con-
vention (VII) Relating to the Conversion of Merchant Ships into Warships,6 
Convention (XI) Relative to Certain Restrictions with Regard to the Exercise 
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of the Right of Capture in Naval War,7 and Convention (XIII) Concerning the 
Rights and Duties of Neutrals in Naval War,s dealt in some manner with the 
status of merchant ships, but none in any way modified the traditional law 
outlined in the preceding paragraph. The conferees' concern for protecting 
merchant ships from attack is no better illustrated than in Hague Convention 
VI, which provided for a grace period for merchant ships that might find 
themselves in an enemy port at the outbreak of hostilities to exit and make their 
way to a friendly port without being subjected to attack. For enemy vessels at 
sea but ignorant of the outbreak of hostilities , the Convention allowed destruc-
tion in some cases but only against payment of compensation and provision for 
the safety of the persons on board and security of the ship's papers. 
The London Naval Conference of 1909, which was called by the British 
Government for the purpose of codifying the Prize Court rules for the Interna-
tional Prize Court contemplated by Hague XII, produced a "Declaration 
Concerning the Laws of Naval Warfare.,,9 Its only provision respecting destruc-
tion of merchant vessels is contained in Chapter IV and deals only with the 
destruction of neutral merchant ships. It authorized their destruction only as an 
exception to the duty of condemnation as prize in cases in which taking the 
captured vessel into port "would involve danger to the safety of the warship or 
to the success of the operations in which she is engaged at the time.,,10 
Following World War I, the 1921-1922 Washington Naval Conference, 
under the sponsorship of the United States, and with the participation of Great 
Britain, France, Italy and Japan, made a further attempt to codify the customary 
law governing attacks on merchant vessels at sea. The resulting draft Treaty,11 
in addition to codifying the traditional rule that enemy merchant ships could 
not be attacked unless they refused to submit to visit and search, contained an 
absolute prohibition on the use of the submarine in a commerce-destroying 
mode. Article 4 provided: 
The Signatory Powers recognize the practical impossibility of using submarines 
as commerce destroyers without violating, as they were violated in the recent war 
of 1914-1918, the requirements universally accepted by civilized nations for the 
protection of the lives of neutrals and noncombatants, and to the end that the 
prohibition of the use of submarines as commerce destroyers shall be universally 
accepted as a part of the law of nations, they now accept that prohibition as 
henceforth binding as between themselves and they invite all other nations to 
adhere thereto.12 
This Treaty never entered into force because of the non-ratification by France, 
but some commentators seem to view the Treaty as an expression of customary 
law. 
The same group of powers that had signed the abortive 1922 Washington 
Treaty assembled again in London in 1930. At that Conference they signed a 
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Treaty for the Limitation and Reduction of Naval Annaments,13 which con-
tained Article 22 again asserting the applicability to submarines of the traditional 
rules prohibiting the sinking of merchant ships without having first placed 
passengers, crew and ship's papers in a place ofsafety.14 Although the Treaty 
was to expire by its own terms in 1936, this article was to remain in force without 
limit of time15 and contained an invitation to all other powers to express their 
assent to the rules. When the signatories of the 1930 Treaty reconvened in 1936, 
they converted Article 22 into a formal proces-verbal, which we know today as 
the London Protocol of1936.16 In addition to 11 signatories, 37 states, including 
all of the belligerents in W orId War II except Romania, had become parties to 
the Protocol before the outbreak of hostilities in 1939. The operative part of the 
text, in its entirety, reads as follows: 
Rules 
(1) In their action with regard to merchant ships, submarines must conform to 
the rules of international law to which surface vessels are subject. 
(2) In particular, except in the case of persistent refusal to stop on being duly 
summoned, or of active resistance to visit or search, a warship, whether surface 
vessel or submarine, may not sink or render incapable of navigation a merchant 
vessel without having first placed passengers, crew and ship's papers in a place of 
safety. For this purpose the ship's boats are not regarded as a place of safety unless 
the safety of the passengers and crew is assured, in the existing sea and weather 
conditions, by the proximity ofland, or the presence of another vessel which is 
in a position to take them on board. 
Is the 1936 Protocol still alive? In 1971 and 1973 Tonga and Fiji respectively 
filed documents of continuity for the Protocol, but they are the only nations to 
have formally become parties to it since January 1939, when Iran became the 
last previous accession. It is worth noting that each of the Twentieth Century 
attempts to reduce to treaty form the law applicable to destruction of enemy 
merchant ships in naval warfare has proceeded from an attempt to codify 
customary law. Bearing in mind that other papers in this symposium address 
practice in more detail,17 it is nevertheless indispensable to review, at least briefly, 
the practices of nations since the Protocol was adopted. 
III. State Practice 
It is axiomatic that the actual practice of states is a key element in the creation 
of international norms. When consistent, long-continued, and acquiesced-in by 
other states, and when combined with the element of opinio juris, such practice 
may be said to be international law. This is true of the international law of armed 
conflict as well as the law of peace. But in trying to draw inferences from state 
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practice in the area of the law of anned conflict, it is important to be cautious 
not to draw sweeping conclusions from incomplete or ambiguous evidence. 
The first post-Protocol test of the rules established by the Protocol occurred 
almost immediately in the Spanish Civil War. In that conflict, neutral merchant 
ships were sunk without warning. The world's reaction was predictably one of 
outrage. The leading European powers (less Italy and Germany, which were 
actively supporting the Franco regime) adopted the Nyon Agreement, which 
provided that submarines which attacked neutral ships contrary to the rules of 
the Protocol should be "counter-attacked and, ifpossible, destroyed.,,18 The 
Council of the League of Nations condemned the attacks as "in violation of the 
most elementary dictates of humanity underlying the established rules of inter-
national law [as set forth in the 1930 London declaration] ... " and declared 
"that all attacks of this kind against any merchant vessels are repugnant to the 
conscience of the civilized nations which now find expression through the 
Council.,,19 Obviously, the parties to the Nyon Agreement and the members 
of the Council of the League who voted for the Council resolution considered 
the Protocol to express the governing rule oflaw. 
The Protocol was put to its severest test in World War II. The practices of 
states in this conflict are dealt with in detail in other papers presented at this 
symposium20 and will not be discussed extensively herein except as necessary to 
serve as a predicate for examining the rules stated in the two post-World War 
II manuals published by the U.S. Navy. Suffice it to say that in that War the 
surface ships, aircraft and submarines of both Allied and Axis powers attacked 
enemy merchant ships (and in some cases neutrals) without warning and without 
making any effort (in most cases) to make provisions for the safety of the 
passengers, crews, or ships' papers as required by the Protocol. Both sides justified 
these practices either on the basis of reprisal (which in itselfis an admission that 
absent the first violation by the other side, the practice is illegal under interna-
tionallaw) or on assertions that the other side had incorporated its merchant 
fleet into the combatant force by mounting offensive weapons on the ships, 
convoying them, requiring them to report enemy submarine sightings, and 
ordering them to take offensive action against surfaced submarines (e.g., ram-
ming), thus taking away their character as "merchant" ships within the meaning 
of the Protocol. These justifications imply that the parties to that conflict 
regarded the 1936 Protocol as continuing in effect, although not applicable to 
the circumstances then existing. 
But the most significant World War II and post-World War II indication of 
an international consensus concerning the continuing validity vel non of the 
Protocol is found in the Nuremberg Tribunal's judgement in the case of Admiral 
Doenitz, who was charged with waging unrestricted submarine warfare in 
violation of the Protocol. The Tribunal found Doenitz not guilty of conducting 
unrestricted submarine warfare against enemy armed merchant ships but guilty 
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of sinking neutral ships and of failure to carry out the warning and rescue 
provisions of the Protocol. The Tribunal stated its reason for its not guilty finding 
as follows: 
Shortly after the outbreak of war the British Admiralty . . . anned its merchant 
vessels, in many cases convoyed them with anned escort, gave orders to send 
position reports upon sighting submarines, thus integrating merchant vessels into 
the warning network of naval intelligence. On 1 October 1939, the British 
Admiralty announced that British merchant ships had been ordered to ram 
U-boats ifpossible.21 
Even as to its guilty findings, however, the Tribunal declined to assess sentence 
against Admiral Doenitz "on the ground of his breaches of the international law 
of submarine warfare" in view of 
all of the facts proved and in particular of an order of the British Admiralty 
announced on 8 May 1940, according to which all vessels should be sunk at sight 
[night?] in the Skagerrak, and the answers to interrogatories by Admiral Nimitz 
stating that unrestricted submarine warfare was carried on in the Pacific Ocean by 
the United States from the first day that Nation entered the war.22 
The latter statement by the Tribunal has been interpreted in differing ways with 
respect to whether the 1936 Protocol remains in effect. One of my Navy 
colleagues, Alex Kerr, in an article in the Naval Institute Proceedings in 1955 stated, 
"the Protocol is no longer law; its provisions are obsolete; it is defunct.,,23 In 
1956, in a lecture celebrating the publication of the predecessor to the current 
Commander's Handbook, I took a contrary view. I stated: 
The Court was merely exercising its power to mitigate the sentence in view of 
its interpretation of the extenuating ev,idence produced before it. . . . That the 
court condemned the action of the defendant is made absolutely clear by its 
findings of guilt. On the other hand, the Court's interpretation of the actions of 
the British (and American actions under what the Court supposed were similar 
circumstances in the Pacific) were factors which could be considered by the court 
in determining a sentence appropriate to the offenses committed by Doenitz. 
Viewed in this light, therefore, the failure of the court to sentence Doenitz with 
regard to his breaches of the law of submarine warfare does not in any way detract 
from the previous findings [of guilty] of the court.24 
Which of these views is correct? Is the humanitarian law of armed conflict 
served by continuing statements giving lip service to an aging treaty that remains 
on the books but has been almost totally ineffective in bringing about the 
practices it was intended to ensure? 
We have no contemporary practice of states with respect to submarine 
warfare, since submarines have not been used as commerce raiders in any of the 
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conflicts since World War II. We do have, however, some suggestions from the 
recent Iraq-Iran Tanker War that states will use whatever means they have 
available to disrupt an enemy's ocean commerce and will, to a large extent, 
ignore the rules laid down in the 1936 Protocol. 
Both Iran and Iraq depended on the oil trade for economic sustenance during 
the conflict. Both had a strong desire to curtail the other's ability to sell oil and 
thus finance the war effort. But the military capabilities and vulnerabilities of the 
two warring states were different. 
From the outset, Iraq had no surface or subsurface warfare capability but did 
have a capable, if small, air force. Iran had a strong surface warfare capability but 
a weak air force. Iraq's oil exports were primarily through pipelines, largely 
inaccessible to Iranian military targeting. Iran's oil exports were carried by 
merchant tankers through the Persian Gulf, but to all intents and purposes they 
were immune from any surface threat because Iraq had no viable naval surface 
forces. 
Iraq, early in the war, commenced an air-interdiction campaign against 
tankers of any nationality carrying Iranian oil. Because of the great distances 
involved, Iraq used its air force frugally, flying one or two aircraft at a time, 
low-level, down the western side of the Gulfbefore turning eastward to attack 
merchant tankers plying the oil trade with Iran. At a predetermined point, the 
aircraft would come to altitude, acquire radar contact with a "large naval target" 
on the Iranian side of Iran's declared exclusion zone and fire missiles. The 
distance from base and the lack of supporting surface forces, coupled with the 
inability to loiter, made it impossible for Iraq to follow the 1936 Protocol, if, 
indeed, the Protocol is applicable to aircraft attacks. In addition, it is arguable 
that these attacks were indiscriminate, violating one of the most fundamental of 
the humanitarian rules of armed conflict. 
Iranian attacks on merchant shipping on the western side of the Gulf were 
clearly indiscriminate. Iran frequently attacked merchantmen known to be 
carrying cargoes neither destined for nor containing exports from Iraq. It seems 
clear that these attacks were not undertaken as a means of attacking Iraqi 
merchant vessels, or merchant vessels destined for or leaving Iraq, since there 
were no Iraqi vessels operating in the Gulf and all sea access to Iraqi ports had 
been totally curtailed, but rather as a means indirectly to coerce the Gulf states 
to stop supporting Iraq and through them to pressure Iraq to cease its attacks on 
tankers serving Iran. 
When diplomatic efforts by a number of states failed to stop attacks on neutral 
vessels by Iran, some "neutral" states, including the United States, resorted to 
escorting their merchant vessels through the Gulf to and from ports in unin-
volved Gulf states. The charges and counter-charges between warring and 
"neutral" states during this conflict make it difficult, at this early date, to assess 
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whether the practices that were followed will have any effect in shaping the law 
of targeting of merchant vessels. 
IV. Bridging the Gap 
A.· The Importance of Manuals 
In a paper published in the immediately preceding volume of the Naval War 
College Blue Book series, Professor Michael Reisman and William K. Lietzau, 
have stated that military manuals and handbooks on international law have two 
important functions: 
First, they are the indispensable modality for disseminating nonnative information 
to those whose behavior is the target of the norms in question. Second, they are 
an essential component in the international lawmaking process, often the litmus 
test of whether a putative prescriptive exercise has produced effective law.2S 
In other words, the Commander's Handbook serves not only as the United States 
government's means of telling naval personnel at all levels of command what rules 
they will follow in carrying out their military mission but also as a statement of 
the United States government's interpretation of what the law is or is becoming. 
In his seminal book, Legal Controls if International ConjIid,26 Professor Julius 
Stone addressed at length the question of attacks on enemy commerce by 
submarines and aircraft. He concludes one section of his analysis with the 
following remarks: 
The immediate task is to regulate the future of naval warfare in which submarines 
and aircraft will join in the attack on enemy commerce; for it is regrettably clear 
that no rule purporting to exclude them from this role, however well grounded 
in humanity, will be brooked. And in any such regulation, the aptness of 
submarines, aircraft and mines for destroying enemy commerce, their need for 
surprise and secrecy for effective and safe operation, the importance in modern 
war of the industrial economy which such destruction undermines, all of these as 
well as the claims of neutral commerce to immunity, and the demands of 
humanity, are factors for consideration ••. 
It is idle to seek to reduce this matter to a cri de coeur of humanity. War law, even 
at its most merciful, is no expression of sheer humanity, save as adjusted to the 
exigencies of military success, a truth as bitter (but no less true) about attacks on 
merchant ships, as about target area saturation bombing. And it is also quite idle 
for Powers whose naval supremacy in surface craft enables them to pursue the aim 
of annihilating the enemy's seaborne commerce without "sink at sight" warfare, 
to expect that States which cannot aspire to such supremacy will refrain from 
seeking to annihilate the commerce by such naval means available to them as 
submarines, aircraft and mines. To refuse to face this will save neither life nor ship 
in any future war; and it will also forestall the growth of real rules for the mitigation 
of suffering under modern conditions. 
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The resort of British and American forces in the Second World War to "sink at 
sight" action against merchant ships only underlines the present view. And the 
consequent refusal of the International Military Tribunal to visit punishment upon 
Admiral Doenitz for breach of the treaty rules as to submarines, earnesdy 
challenges the publicists of all nations to rethink their positions. Only thus can some 
part oj the humanity which now enters this sphere on paper only, reenter the field oj war 
practice controlled by law. Xl 
Does the fonnulation for attacks on merchant vessel, both neutral and enemy, 
contained in the Commander's Handbook reflect this rethinking urged by Professor 
Stone, or does it merely perpetuate a "paper only" entry of humanity into this 
field of warfare? 
B. The Predecessor Manual (NWIP 10-2) 
Before looking in detail at the provisions of the 1987 Handbook, it might be 
appropriate to take a brieflook at the Handbook's 1955 predecessor, The Law of 
Naval Waifi:lre (NWIP 10_2).28 This ma,nual's provisions with respect to destruc-
tion of enemy merchant vessels prior to capture are contained in one succinct 
subsection as follows: 
Enemy merchant vessels may be attacked and destroyed, either with or without 
prior warning, in any of the following circumstances: 
1. Actively resisting visit and search or capture. 
2. Refusing to stop upon being duly summoned. 
3. Sailing under convoy of enemy warships or enemy military aircraft. 
4. If armed, and there is reason to believe that such armament has been 
used, or is intended for use, offensively against an enemy. 
5. If incorporated into, or assisting in any way, the intelligence system 
of an enemy's armed forces. 
6. If actin~in any capacity as a naval or military auxiliary to an enemy's 
armed forces. 
It is to be noted that the stated rules make no distinction as to whether the 
attacking unit is a surface warship, military aircraft of submarine. In a note to 
this section, it is stated that the rules of the 1936 Protocol are deemed declaratory 
of customary international law and "have been interpreted as applicable to 
belligerent military aircraft in their action toward enemy merchant vessels. ,,30 
In a Naval War College Blue Book written contemporaneously with the 
publication of NWIP 10-2, which is essentially an exegesis of NWIP 10-2, 
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Professor Robert W. Tucker, the author of both publications, justifies the section 
503b(3) fonnulation as follows: 
It is believed that this provision does not substantially depart from the requirements 
of the traditional law, although it does focus attention upon those recent practices 
of belligerents which serve, and have always served, to deprive belligerent 
merchant vessels of immunity from attack.31 
In further explanation of "those recent practices" which serve to deprive 
belligerent merchant vessels of their immunity from attack, Tucker explains that 
they were not, as some contended, the arrival of the submarine and aircraft on 
the scene, with their effectiveness as commerce raiders and their inability to 
follow the traditional rules of visit, search and capture, but rather the integration 
of merchant vessels into the military effort of the enemy, thus destroying the 
assumption upon which the traditional rule was based-i.e., that there was a 
clear distinction between enemy merchant vessels and enemy warships?2 
In essence then, the 1955 U.S. naval manual affinned the continuing validity 
of the 1936 Protocol but adapted its application to the conditions that might 
exist in a conflict in which the enemy incorporated its merchant vessels into the 
military effort, thus essentially converting them into naval auxiliaries. It did not, 
however, allow submarines any special exemptions based on their particular 
operational capabilities and limitations or their vulnerabilities when surfaced. 
c. Rules Applicable to Surface Warships 
The 1987 manual, The Commander's Handbook, appears to follow a pattern 
similar to that ofNWIP 10-2, although with some interesting variations. Instead 
of treating all naval platforms in one section, it divides the rules between three 
sections, one applicable to surface ships, one to submarines, and one to military 
aircraft. The provisions applicable to surface ships are found in paragraph 8.2.2.2, 
entided "Destruction," which provide in pertinent part: 
Although the rules of the 1936 London ::'=-.:-t .)col continue to apply to surface 
warships, they must be interpreted in light of current technology, including 
satellite communications, over-the-horizon weapons, and antiship missile systems, 
as well as the customary practice of belligerents in World War II. Accordingly, 
enemy merchant vessels may be attacked and destroyed by surface warships, either 
with or without prior warning, in any of the following circumstances: 
1. Actively resisting visit and search or capture 
2. Refusing to stop upon being summoned to do so 
3. Sailing under convoy of enemy warships or enemy military aircraft 
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4. Ifanned 
5. If incorporated into or assisting in any way, the intelligence system 
of the enemy's anned forces 
6. If acting in any capacity as a naval or military auxiliary to an enemy's 
anned forces 
7. Ifintegrated into the enemy's warfighting/war sustaining effort and 
compliance with the rules of the 1936 London Protocol would, under the 
circumstances of the specific encounter, subject the surface warship to 
imminent danger or would otherwise preclude mission accomplishment. 
The first six of these conditions parallel the conditions set forth in NWIP 
10-2. The only departure of substance is the omission in condition 4 of the 
statement, "and there is reason to believe that such armament has been used, or 
is intended for use, offensively against an enemy." The Annotated Supplement to 
The Commander's Handbook on the Law oJNaval Operations explains this departure 
from the NWIP 10-2 version as follows: 
In light of modern weapons it is impossible to determine, if it ever was possible, 
whether the annament on merchant ships is to be used offensively against an 
enemy or merely defensively. It is unrealistic to expect enemy forces to be able 
to make that determination.33 
The seventh condition is new and was added, according to the Annotated 
Supplement, to cope with the deficiency in condition six, perceived by Professor 
Mallison, that a possible interpretation of this paragraph might prohibit destruc-
tion of an enemy merchant ship carrying cargo of substantial military importance 
but is not a "military or naval auxiliary" because it is not owned by or under the 
exclusive control of the armed forces.34 
Two comments concerning this statement of the rules applicable to surface 
warships are appropriate. The first is that the explanatory part of the paragraph 
justifies the departure from the strict rules of the 1936 Protocol in the first place 
by advances in technology ("including satellite communications, over-the-
horizon weapons, and antiship missile systems") and only secondarily on the 
customary practice of belligerents that evolved during and following W orId War 
II. This justification was specifically eschewed by Tucker in framing the 
exceptions in the 1955 naval manual. The Annotation does not explain this 
departure, but it is consistent with Julius Stone's comment, quoted earlier, that 
the "aptness of submarines, aircraft and mines for destroying enemy commerce" 
is a factor for consideration in framing regulations for the future of naval 
warfare.35 
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The second comment is that nowhere in the Commander's Handbook is there 
a statement as to who has the authority to make the determinations required by 
conditions before destruction may take place. On this latter point, the first two 
conditions, which are stated in the 1936 Protocol itself, would appear appropriate 
for determinations by the on-scene commander, whether he is on the surface, 
in the air or in a submarine. Conditions three and four are capable of objective 
determination by the on-scene commander in most cases. But conditions five, 
six and seven are, and more appropriately should be, for determination at the 
policy level of government and implemented by a service-wide directive. 
Finally it would appear that the ultimate effect of the formulation of the rules 
in paragraph 8.2.2.2 is to apply the London Protocol constraints only in those 
circumstances in which the enemy merchant vessel is totally defenseless and its 
destruction without warning offers no clear military advantage to the attacker. 
D. Rules Applicable to Submarines 
The Commander's Handbook treats submarines in paragraph 8.3.1, which states 
initially that, "[t]he conventional rules of naval warfare pertaining to submarine 
operations against enemy merchant shipping constitute one of the least 
developed areas of armed conflict." This statement standing alone is perplexing. 
The real question facing those who must implement the rules is whether the 
"conventional" law has been so modified by desuetude or the development of 
superseding customary law that the "conventional" law has been rendered 
defunct. 
The initial sentence does not, however, stand alone. The text goes on to 
acknowledge that the London Protocol "makes no distinction between sub-
marines and surface warships with respect to the interdiction of enemy merchant 
shipping." It states further that, "[t]he impracticability of imposing upon sub-
marines the same targeting constraints as burden surface warships is reflected in 
the practice of belligerents of both sides during World War II when submarines 
regularly attacked and destroyed without warning enemy merchant shipping." 
It acknowledges, however, that these practices were justified as reprisals or 
because the enemy had integrated its merchant marine into its war-fighting/war-
sustaining effort. Then, stating explicidy that the rules stated are a synthesis of 
those contained in the London Protocol of 1936 and "the customary practice 
of belligerents during and following World War II," the paragraph states that 
submarines must: 
provide for the safety of passengers, crew, and ship's papers before destruction of 
an enemy merchant vessel unless: 
1. The enemy merchant vessel refuses to stop when summoned to do 
so or otherwise resists capture. 
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2. The enemy merchant vessel is sailing under armed convoy or is itself 
armed. 
3. The enemy merchant vessel is assisting in any way the enemy's 
military intelligence system or is acting in any capacity as a naval auxiliary 
to the enemy's armed forces. 
4. The enemy has integrated its merchant shipping into its war-fight-
ing/war-sustaining effort and compliance with this rule would, under the 
circumstances of the specific encounter, subject the submarine to imminent 
danger or would otherwise preclude mission accomplishment. 
The Annotated Supplement to this section of the Commander's Handbook states 
that, "[t]hese exceptions are identical to those applicable to surface warfare. ,,36 
If so, why are they listed separately? The Annotated Supplement does not explain. 
In fact, there are minor, but perhaps significant, differences. 
The first is in the chapeau to the listing of circumstances authorizing 
destruction. In paragraph 8.2.2.2, which is applicable to surface warships, the 
chapeau reads in part that "enemy merchant vessels may be attacked and 
destroyed by surface warships, either with or without prior warning, in any of 
the following circumstances: .... " In paragraph 8.3.1, which is applicable to 
submarines, the corresponding language reads as follows: "[the applicable law] 
imposes upon submarines the responsibility to provide for the safety of pas-
sengers, crew, and ship's papers before destruction of any enemy merchant vessel 
unless: .... " In the case of surface ships, unless one of the circumstances applies, 
a surface ship may not attack and destroy. In case of submarines, the right to 
attack and destroy seems to be assumed, but not without first providing for the 
safety of crew, passengers and ship's papers. Further, there is no mention in this 
paragraph of what is meant by providing for the safety of crew, passengers and 
ship's papers. By referring back to paragraph 8.2.2.2, the commander can find a 
reference to the 1936 Protocol and its statement that the ship's lifeboats are 
generally not considered a place of safety, but the amalgamation in the discussion 
part of the two paragraphs of the rules of the 1936 Protocol and the practices of 
World War II may leave some doubt in the commander's mind-as it does in 
mine-as to whether the Commander's Handbook intends that the constraints 
stated in paragraph 8.2.2.2 are equally applicable to submarines. 
The second difference between the statement of the rules applicable to 
submarines and those for surface warships is the omission of "actively resisting 
visit and search" in the listing of circumstances applicable to submarine attacks. 
This omission is apparently a tacit admission, not acknowledged in the 1955 
Manual (NWIP 10-2), that it is impossible for submarines to carry out the 
traditional form of visit and search-a fact obvious to naval planners since the 
integration of the submarine into maritime commerce warfare prior to World 
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War I but papered over by negotiators who fonnulated the rules developed at 
each of the principal naval conferences of 1930 and 1936.37 The Commander's 
Handbook thus accepts the fact that visit and search will not be attempted by 
submarines. In light of this omission, it is strange that the listing includes refusal 
"to stop when summoned to do so or otherwise resists capture." To suggest that 
a submarine might risk its safety by surfacing and signalling an enemy merchant 
vessel to stop and then to capture it seems just as unlikely as to expect it to carry 
out a visit and search. Nevertheless, the removal of any reference to visit and 
search in the submarine section seems to bring a greater sense of reality to the 
rules. 
Whether this greater sense of reality comports with international law remains 
unresolved. In the McDougalian frame of reference, it is a "claim" put forth by 
the United States "which other decision-makers, external to the [United States 
will] weigh and appraise ... and ultimately accept or reject.,,38 The manuals of 
other naval powers will provide evidence of whether this" claim" by the United 
States has been accepted or rejected, but only the crucible of actual conflict, and 
the outcome thereof, will provide the final test. 
E. Rules Applicable to Military Aircraft 
Just as in the case of submarines, the rules applicable to military aircraft are 
fonnulated separately from those applicable to surface warships. Paragraph 8.4 
provides in pertinent part: 
Enemy merchant vessels . . . may be attacked and destroyed by military aircraft 
only under the following circumstances: 
1. When refusing to comply with directions from the intercepting 
aircraft. 
2. When assisting in any way the enemy's military intelligence system 
or acting in any capacity as auxiliaries to the enemy's anned forces. 
3. When sailing under convoy of enemy warships, escorted by enemy 
military aircraft, or anned. 
4. When otherwise integrated into the enemy's warfighting or war-sus-
taining effort. 
Neither the text of the Commander's Handbook itself nor the Annotated 
Supplement indicates the derivation of the rules made applicable to aircraft attacks 
on enemy merchant ships.39 The 1936 Protocol does not apply, and no other 
explicit conventional rules exist. Some publicists have suggested that the 1936 
Protocol rules are a part of customary international law applicable to aircraft, but 
the basis for such a conclusion certainly cannot be found in the practices of 
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belligerents in World War II. The authors of the Commander's Handbook seem 
to have applied the humanitarian considerations underlying the 1936 Protocol, 
as well as the basic principles of humanitarian law concerning the distinctions 
between military objectives and civilians, to derive a set of rules similar to those 
applicable to surface ships and submarines. 
The basic rules are similar, with modifications made necessary by the 
limitations inherent in aircraft. The inability to visit and search or to capture is 
recognized. For conditions depending on resistance to these actions, the 
Commander's Handbook substitutes refusal to comply with directions from the 
intercepting aircraft. The rules do not mandate an obligation to provide for the 
safety of passengers and crew, this being a practical impossibility, although a 
subsequent paragraph does require, "[t]o the extent that military exigencies 
permit," that the aircraft search for survivors and report their location to units 
that might be capable of rendering assistance. 
Of the four conditions which allow for attack by aircraft, the last three are 
essentially a restatement of conditions three through six applicable to surface 
ships. The reasons for the variation in wording and arrangement are not apparent. 
As in the case of attacks by surface ships, whether a particular merchant ship has 
been integrated into the enemy's war-fighting or war-sustaining effort is a 
question which seems beyond the competence of the on-scene commander and 
should be addressed at the national level. Whether the vessel is under convoy, 
refuses to comply with the directions of the aircraft, or is armed may be the 
subject of individual determination at the scene, but the aircraft may subject itself 
to substantial risk in determining whether its target is armed before making its 
attack. 
Just as in the case of surface ships, the conditions stated are conditions 
precedent to attack. Unlike the situation with submarines, the right to attack is 
not assumed. 
V. Assessment 
Any oftoday's navies that attempt to prescribe rules for conduct of sea warfare 
against commerce face the same dilemma that faced the authors of The 
Commander's Handbook in trying to walk a fine line between the conventional 
law as set forth in the 1936 Protocol and the actual practices of states that occurred 
in World War II and subsequent conflicts. The 1936 Protocol is still on the 
books, and has not been renounced nor formally repudiated by any state that is 
a party to it. The practices of all parties that took part in World War II bore no 
resemblance to those required by the Protocol. But these practices were justified 
not by repudiation of the Protocol but rather by justifications that purportedly 
rendered it inapplicable to the particular circumstances under which the conflict 
was carried out. The rationale for the Nuremberg Tribunal's acquittal of Admiral 
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Doenitz of the charge of unrestricted submarine warfare against enemy merchant 
fleets gives further credibility to the claim that the 1936 Protocol was not defunct 
but was merely inapplicable. 
The Commander's Handbook seems to accept the continued viability of the 
Protocol but assumes that,just as in World War II, the practices of states in future 
conflicts will be such as to make it inapplicable in most circumstances. Recent 
practice in those few instances of post-World War II conflicts in which the 
warring states carried on commerce warfare would seem to justifY that con-
clusion. 
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